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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-1656
___________
NINA SHAHIN,
                                      Appellant
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE 
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of Delaware
(D. Del. Civ. No. 06-cv-0289)
District Judge: Gregory M. Sleet
_______________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant
to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 16, 2009
Before:   MCKEE, FISHER and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Filed: September 14, 2009)
_________
 OPINION
_________
2PER CURIAM
Nina Shahin, proceeding pro se, filed the underlying action alleging employment
discrimination against the Department of Finance for the State of Delaware (“Delaware”). 
She alleges Delaware discriminated against her on the basis of age in December 2004
when it decided not to employ her.  She later filed an amended complaint, which included
ten additional alleged incidents of discrimination.  In March 2008, the District Court
granted in part and denied in part Delaware’s motion to dismiss.  The court denied the
motion to the extent it that sought dismissal of Shahin’s request for prospective injunctive
relief, and granted it in all other respects.  The court also denied Shahin’s second motion
to amend the original complaint as moot and her request for waiver of costs, and ordered
that her amended complaint be stricken.  Shahin appealed, and we dismissed the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
Delaware filed a motion for reargument, which the District Court treated as a
motion for reconsideration, to which Shahin did not respond.  Shahin filed motions to
consolidate cases and for sanctions against counsel for Delaware.  On February 25, 2009,
the District Court granted Delaware’s motion for reconsideration and dismissed the case,
declining to exercise jurisdiction over any supplemental state law claims.  The court also
denied Shahin’s motions as moot.  Shahin timely appealed.
     We generally review a district court’s decision on a motion for reconsideration for1
abuse of discretion.  Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d
669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999).  However, where, as in the instant appeal, the decision is
“predicated on an issue of law, such an issue is reviewed de novo....”  Id. 
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In this case, our review of the District Courts’ orders is plenary.   See Santiago v.1
GMAC Mortg. Group, Inc., 417 F.3d 384, 386 (3d Cir. 2005).  “To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  In deciding
a motion to dismiss, a court must determine whether the complaint “pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”  Id.
A complaint brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”)
“will be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies if a supporting EEOC
charge was not filed within 180 or 300 days (depending on state law) of notification to the
employee of the adverse employment action.”  Ruehl v. Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 382
(3d Cir. 2007); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d).  This requirement is a “non-jurisdictional
prerequisite.”  Ruehl, 500 F.3d at 384.  The record reveals that Shahin exhausted only the
claim that is the subject of her original complaint.  The District Court, therefore, properly
struck the amended complaint, which attempted to add ten additional and unexhausted
claims.  Likewise, the court properly exercised its discretion in denying Shahin’s second
     As discussed above, Shahin attempted to amend her complaint to include claims2
against state officials, but failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to those claims.
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motion to amend the complaint to add additional unexhausted claims because such an
amendment would have been futile.  See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
Shahin alleges that Delaware discriminated against her on the basis of age, in
violation of the ADEA, and she seeks damages and injunctive relief.  The ADEA includes
in its definition of employer “a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency...of
a state.”  29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2).  However, the Supreme Court has held that, in the
ADEA, Congress did not validly abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity to suits for
money damages by private individuals under the Eleventh Amendment.   Kimel v. Fl. Bd.
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).  The Eleventh Amendment permits suits for prospective
injunctive relief against state officials.  Ex Parte v. Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
However, this doctrine “has no application in suits against the States and their agencies,
which are barred regardless of the relief sought.”  Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Swer Auth. v.
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (citations omitted).  Shahin filed her suit
against the Department of Finance and did not name any state officials.   Therefore, the2
District Court correctly dismissed this action. 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the appeal presents no substantial
question.  Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d
Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
